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Policing and the Responsibility to Protect in Oceania:  
A preliminary survey of policing aid programs in the ‘Arc Of Responsibility’ 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents preliminary research about the donor aid programs that contribute 
to police-building in the ‘Arc of Responsibility’ in the Pacific and Australia’s ‘near-
abroad’. It focuses on the capacity building projects that exist in Timor Leste and 
Solomon Islands with respect to police training. The two cases represent examples of 
exogenous state-building, situations in which the form and function of the state is to a 
great extent being dictated by outside actors. The international community provides 
different forms of assistance toward strengthening state capacity in the policing sector 
and this paper explores how police training programs and the deployment of 
peacekeeping police articulate with the concept of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as 
outlined in the UN Secretary General’s 2009 report. This early survey forms part of a 
larger project that will include Papua New Guinea. One issue so far which has 
become apparent is that there are a range of training programs and models in place, 
conducted by different international actors. While the language of police training, at 
this stage at least, does not specifically include references to the Responsibility to 
Protect, there is a great deal of intersection between the basic functions of police in 
Protection of Civilians (POC) in state-building missions and the broader intentions of 
RtoP.  
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Policing and the Responsibility to Protect in Oceania:  
A preliminary survey of policing aid programs in the ‘Arc Of Responsibility’ 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is a preliminary examination of the support given by international aid 
donors in the policing sector in support of state building projects in Timor Leste and 
Solomon Islands. It forms part of a wider study of the political impact and influence 
of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) principles on police forces in Timor Leste, 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. In the past decade, these three states have 
been described as forming part of an ‘Arc of Instability’, the area to the North of 
Australia and across into the South Western Pacific Islands where ‘weak states’ 
exhibit problems of political instability, institutional fragility, a lack of infrastructure, 
poor service delivery in health and education, relatively high levels of crime and 
corruption, and have a high possibility of incidence of human rights abuses.  
 
The realisation within state-building and peacekeeping debates that the local 
community has a strong role to play in any linkage of development with security has 
meant that, rather than simply stigmatise weak states, a more positive attitude comes 
in demonstrating that the onus of providing regional security is jointly shared by the 
state in question, its immediate members and other interested actors. With so-called 
‘weak states’ the emphasis is now largely on the role of the international community 
to assist in creating viable and stable forms of government. For Oceania, the term 
‘Arc Of Responsibility’ has been around since at least 2007 and it better connotes the 
mutuality involved in the complex business of state building.  
 
This paper examines (1) the evolution of the concept of RtoP and its articulation with 
the role of policing in protection of civilian populations; (2) the major aid donors to 
Timor Leste and Solomon Islands; and (3) the variety of police training and which 
nations play a significant role in providing police training. 
 
The ultimate objective of the project as a whole is to assess if the police forces that 
are in the process of being created are adopting the principles of RtoP either formally 
(i.e. in the language of RtoP) or more informally (i.e. the norms and practices of RtoP 
but not the language), but research on these matters commenced only in April 2010 so 
the data to answers is yet to be collected. It is expected that following fieldwork in 
Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, in-country interviews with 
police trainers and those being trained, community representatives and women’s 
organizations, some light will be shed on whether the efforts to create more 
accountable, responsible and professional police services are upholding the norms and 
principles of RtoP and contributing to these states being able to care for their own 
populations, thus avoiding any need for external intervention in support of human 
rights through an RtoP ‘trigger’. 
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Sovereignty, RtoP and Policing 
 
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is an emerging doctrine in international law and 
politics that aims to increase the capacity of states to prevent abuses of human rights. 
The Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) report The Responsibility to Protect clearly places the onus on 
the world’s states to accept the idea of sovereignty as a responsibility ‘to protect the 
dignity and basic rights of all people within the state’ (ICISS, 2001: 8). This heralded 
a shift from the previous position of regarding sovereignty as in theory at least, if not 
in practice, wholly sacrosanct. In the Cold War world, sovereignty basically meant 
non-intervention in a state’s internal affairs; it was something of a shibboleth of 
statehood. In the post-Cold War world the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) doctrine has shifted international relations towards a general normative view 
that state sovereignty involves the human security of a state’s population. If a state is 
unwilling or unable to provide this then the international community, it is argued, 
should intervene to provide that protection. Yet not all states have the capacity to do 
this: some are less able (and some less willing) to protect their populations from harm. 
Even if governments desire this end varying state capacity is related to the separate 
histories of the countries of the world, levels of industrialisation and modernity and 
integration into the global market and the global international political system.  
 
The dramatic increase from 1945 in the number of internationally recognised states 
participating in international affairs is a direct consequence of decolonisation, but it is 
also a by-product of the creation of the United Nations itself, and on its emphasis on 
self-determination. United Nations membership is now almost synonymous with 
statehood. This has meant that international acceptance of statehood rests perhaps 
more on the international community than on a territory’s own population deeming its 
government to be legitimate. At the same time, once a state is recognised as legitimate 
it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to cease to exist. Even the most war-torn 
and factionalised of bounded territories, such as Somalia, still enjoys international 
acceptance of its right to exist, and the trappings of state recognition at the United 
Nations, although exactly who or what Somalia’s UN representatives actually 
represent is a good question. That a ‘government’ exists only because it has been 
imposed by the will of a neighbouring state, and controls only a few square kilometres 
of its national capital, then sovereignty is a sort of shared delusion. Despite the many 
breeches of sovereignty, the international state system has been created upon, and can 
only function with, this linkage between a defined territorial state, its internal rule and 
the international recognition of a government, all of which conveying legitimacy to 
the state.  
 
Despite these modern anomalies as Somalia, and to an extent Afghanistan, where the 
world recognises that some sort of state needs to exist in a specific place, historically 
a state’s capability to exist and be regarded as internationally legitimate has 
traditionally rested largely on its capacity to exert what Stephen Krasner (1999: 11-
12) calls its ‘domestic sovereignty’, that is, the authority and control of the 
government and the rule of law within a specific territory. An essential step in 
creating and maintaining this domestic sovereignty is the ability of a state to move 
beyond what Michael Mann (1988:4) has referred to as ‘despotic power’ — the brute 
imposition of political will through armed force — to ‘infrastructural power’ where a 
non-coercive bureaucracy is able to provide services to the population. This move 
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established a legitimate role for the state in the lives of its people. In Oceania 
however, decolonisation occurred with little to no economic development and the 
structures that would have supported the services in education, health, and roads were 
often non existent. Wage labour was uncommon so taxation revenues were limited 
and unable to meet even the lowest service demands and aspirations of citizens.  
 
In Europe the process of state building took many centuries, and it was incredibly 
violent (Tilly, 1992). The Weberian idea of the state as a community of people within 
a bounded territory who exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence still 
holds true. The difference today is that recognition (including UN membership) plays 
a decisive role in admitting new states to the international community. Even with the 
newest states the international expectation is that they, as well as states decolonised 
within recent memory, will conform to Western liberal and normative concepts of 
respect for human rights when attempting to exert or enforce their authority. The 
principle legitimate means through which authority can be enforced are the army and 
the police. Not all states have such a clear distinction between these two ‘bodies of 
armed men’, using Lenin’s phrase, as is customary in Western democratic theory, 
where the armed forces protect the state from external threats and the police protect 
civilians by apprehending those who break the law of the state, and attempt to prevent 
harm to civilians.  
 
This is however the distinction that is being created through international assistance in 
resolving conflict situations and peace missions generally. Among peace operations 
policy-makers there is also a growing recognition that it will take some time for a 
developing state emerging from conflict to bring its military and police services to a 
level where they can function professionally, and without outside monitoring. What is 
at stake here is building a police culture and a military culture in which the forces of 
the state protect civilians and do not abuse their legitimate powers (ICF, 2010: 
Session 9). This implies that such forces work for the state, obey its laws themselves 
and derive their authority from the manner in which they behave professionally 
towards the citizenry and population at large  
 
These expectations for the forces of states in the developing world may be lofty, but 
they are expectations that they also hold for themselves. They have not been thrust 
onto them entirely but represent a changing behaviour, which is part of the story of a 
reinterpretation of the rights and duties of sovereignty. 
 
In theory, member states of the United Nations are meant to comply with the wishes 
of the Security Council as part of their obligations (Art. 2.5), yet as the ICISS noted 
back in 2001, tensions exist between the claims that states make over their 
competence in governance, their efforts to provide security for people against threats 
to state security, and the ‘practical protection for ordinary people’ (ICISS, 2001: 11). 
In a state like Sudan the attempted application of RtoP meant that the Sudanese 
government was tasked with removing the abuses suffered by its population in Darfur 
(Williams and Bellamy, 2005: 32), despite being responsible for the arming, funding 
and conduct of genocide through both its own actions and those of the Janjaweed 
militias. Logically this was consistent with the objective that the first test of RtoP lies 
with the state, and only if it is ‘unwilling or unable’ to stop violence against 
vulnerable populations can other action, such as military intervention for 
humanitarian protection purposes, be explored (ICISS, 2001: 9). Intervention remains, 
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and should be, a last resort; the onus is on the state to treat its population 
appropriately and this requires structures that will support a discourse of the 
protection of human rights. 
 
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome (UNGA 2005:30) contained specific affirmations by the world’s states on 
the ‘Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity’ (Paras. 138 and 139). This demonstrates that states 
themselves believe that it is part of their role to resist the temptation of using their 
‘legitimate’ coercive violence in an illegitimate manner, or to solve complex political 
situations in ways that may lead to large scale human rights abuses. In addition, from 
April 2006 onwards the UN Security Council (UNSC) has clearly framed a number of 
resolutions on matters that involve vulnerable populations as Chapter VII mandates, 
that is, humanitarian concerns are seen as threats to international peace and security. 
The language used has increasingly been the language of RtoP. For example, UNSC 
Resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts 
(UNSC 2006: 1) specifically reaffirmed the World Summit Outcome, giving it the 
force of international law, and the UN Secretary General’s report (UNGA, 2009) to 
the 63rd Session of the General Assembly of 12 January 2009 Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, further clarifies the range of approaches that may be 
employed to assist states in living up to their responsibilities to their own people.  
 
The Secretary General’s report has three pillars: (1) the protection responsibilities of 
the state; (2) international assistance and capacity building; and (3) timely and 
decisive response. Policing belongs in pillar 2 where there is a clear need for 
international police to enter into post-conflict situations along with the military 
(UNSC 2009: 18 - Para 39 and 41), along with a general call for ‘creative solutions’. 
If the forces of the state can be made to function properly then pillar 3, which flags 
intervention as an absolutely last option, should not be required at all. The UN is 
increasingly moving to adopt comprehensive measures to prevent conflict “both 
upstream (preventive peacebuilding) and downstream (post-conflict peacebuilding)” 
(IFCPO 2009: 15), and in doing so the thresholds for international capacity building 
assistance are lower than they would be for a Chapter VI or VII mission (UNSC, 
2009: 22 – Para 50). This involves a holistic approach that involves local government, 
civil society and media in utilising whatever strategies already exist in a post-conflict 
environment. Security Sector Reform (SSR), is now considered a key to all 
peacebuilding (IFCPO 2009: 15). For this reason the role of police in post-conflict 
countries is of special interest, as is the training they receive from donor states whose 
interests lie in making weak states stable over the long term. 
 
As such donor states play a part in making a stable world order through state building 
projects operating consensually though the United Nations (such as the United 
Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste - UNMIT), or through regional state-
building missions, such as Solomon Islands (the Regional Assistance Mission 
Solomon Islands – RAMSI). Both of these missions have policing components. 
 
With RtoP fast becoming a centrepiece of conceptions of international peace and 
security, recent UNSC Resolutions have enlarged the concept of ‘threat’ to take in 
violence against civilians, particularly women and children, along with arms 
trafficking, sexual slavery, human rights abuses and environmental damage. The 
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pressures on developing states to operate with security sectors that reflect best 
practice in the developed world is strong, and donor states are keen to see it happen. 
 
At a regional level in Oceania the Australian Labor Party government of Kevin Rudd 
has indicated it wants a new era of international relations in Asia and the Pacific 
(Hawksley, 2009). The Australian government thus has a large and important 
opportunity to play a part in strengthening compliance with RtoP norms through its 
bilateral Overseas Development Assistance and its contribution to multilateral state-
building missions. AusAID’s funding of the University of Queensland-based Asia-
Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the $2 million in project money 
allocated by the Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund, contributes to knowledge 
of the RtoP concept in the region and can hopefully make a direct contribution to the 
human security of vulnerable populations in the Asia Pacific (ARPF 2010). We must 
however acknowledge that RtoP is a relatively new concept and that it must compete 
with other globalising discourses around state security in the face of challenges, such 
as transnational crime and terrorism, for policy adoption and implementation.   
 
One of these parallel but perhaps not competing concepts is the classical 
peacekeeping notion of Protection of Civilians (POC), the subject of the 27-29 April 
2010 International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations hosted by the Asia 
Pacific Civil Military Centre for Excellence, held in Canberra and Queanbeyan. In the 
first session Major General (Retired) Tim Ford, a former Australian Military Adviser 
to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and former Chief of Staff for the UN 
Truce Supervision Organization (UNSTO) in the Middle East, noted that POC and 
RtoP are not the same thing. In his presentation he stated: “Protection of Civilians is a 
mandated peacekeeping task that occurs with the consent of the host nation.” He went 
on to discuss how “POC involves a range of international, national and local measures 
to support and provide protection, ensure security, and support actions that eliminate 
the ability of perpetrators, or potential perpetrators, to threaten a population” (Ford, 
2010). Ford thus views POC as a stage in state building and capacity building within 
states to ensure their own security. POC therefore clearly supports the thrust of RtoP, 
but it is not exactly the same thing. We may regard RtoP, and especially its emphasis 
on intervention, as the worst case scenario while POC remains the fundamental duty 
of every state. This point was echoed in the 2010 Challenges Forum with Izumi 
Nakamitzu, the Director of the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training at the 
United Nations, claiming that while the UN was looking toward creating mission-
wide protection strategies for civilians the clear understanding was that host states 
(those states in which UN troops and police were deployed) had the primary 
responsibility to respect their civilians and to inform the UN of the areas where it 
could make a difference to the capacity of the state to perform this function more 
effectively (Nakamitzu 2010). 
 
In UN operations at least, the host country, often weak and divided by civil war, and 
with few state institutions of any competency, has the primary task of looking after its 
own people, and can suggest how the international community, including police 
forces, can assist it to perform this task better. While this sounds nonsensical, this is 
exactly what RtoP is really all about – building the capacity of states in the areas of 
law enforcement so that human rights abuses will no longer occur and the reason for 
any potential intervention will be removed. As such policing is central to the domestic 
upholding of both POC and RtoP, and therefore the first issue supports the second. 
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POC, RtoP and Policing in Oceania 
 
The states of Oceania in particular vary widely in their political, economic and 
cultural histories. The process of state formation was very uneven over time with 
some states taking form in the late nineteenth century (e.g. Australia, New Zealand) 
while for others decolonisation and independence is more recent (e.g. Papua New 
Guinea 1975; Solomon Islands 1978; Kiribati 1994; Timor Leste 2002). Economic 
development histories vary widely within the region: some are primarily self-
sufficient and only barely linked to the global market (PNG, Solomon Islands); while 
others are almost ‘post-industrial’ economies, being primarily based on services 
(Australia, New Zealand). The sort of developing industrial economies of South East 
Asia (e.g. Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia) are not present in the Pacific. The 
result is that asymmetries of power and capacity operate throughout a Pacific region 
that is critical to Australian security. Strong and apparently weak states exist side by 
side in a system of complex interdependence. There are personal and commercial 
links in trade, migration, culture, and more formal governmental links in state 
cooperation through skills transfers, education and training. A central part of the 
North-South aid flow from Australia and New Zealand to Oceania is the cooperation 
provided for what is termed ‘state-building’ in countries such as Solomon Islands, 
through Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), and in Timor 
Leste through the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT). 
Bilateral assistance from Australia remains a significant contributor to state 
strengthening (strongim gavman) efforts in Papua New Guinea (PNG), even after the 
in-line policing component of the 2004 Enhanced Cooperation Program had to be 
abandoned (Hawksley 2005: 36-37; Hawksley 2006: 170).  
 
A state’s police force is, along with the army, the main way in which a state can 
attempt to maintain control when the rule of law is threatened. A problem however 
exists if these forces do not themselves obey their own state’s laws, or abuse the 
powers they are given which are meant to provide security and protection to citizens. 
In the sense of developing respect for RtoP, if the institutions of state security have a 
history of abuse of human rights, participation in summary executions and other acts, 
then the implementation of an RtoP agenda will be complicated, if not impossible. 
The training being provided to police forces is therefore critical at the basic level of 
creating a climate of security within civil society, which can lead to the building of 
civic support for human rights and to the emergence of a police culture of respecting 
human rights. The training and capacity development being provided by the 
international community, particularly Australia, Portugal, and New Zealand, to the 
police forces of Timor Leste and Solomon Islands therefore contributes specifically to 
state-building through POC, and thus indirectly to RtoP by laying the groundwork for 
respect of rights by the forces of the state.  
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Timor Leste 
 
In the case of the new state of Timor Leste, the deep factionalism and divided political 
loyalties between the army and police forces developed over four years and erupted in 
May 2006 when Timor Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL)1 personnel shot a large group 
of unarmed police in Dili near the police headquarters, killing nine and injuring more 
than twenty, which led to the police abandoning their posts. In the consequent looting 
and arson there was internal upheaval with some 150,000 people displaced 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007: 1097-9). On 11 February 2008 there were assassination 
attempts on the President Jose Ramos Horta and the Prime Minister (and former 
President), Xanana Gusmao. Early reports of the attack noted some twenty people 
were injured—including President Horta, who was shot twice in the stomach—while 
rebel leader Alfredo Reinado, responsible for the 2006 police attacks and who had 
since been at large, was killed (ABC, 2008). With high youth unemployment, poverty, 
a limited industrial base and an economy based on the export of one commodity, state 
building is difficult. Enforcing order will be challenging. This all points to the dire 
need for a policing strategy that will not only work, but one that also respects human 
rights and which works with local people for local solutions.  
 
The legal system of Timor Leste is still developing and while laws are being written 
in Portuguese very few of the younger generation can understand the language. For 
the state as a whole, estimates of linguistic fluency in Portuguese range between 5-
25% of the population. Most of the Policia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNTL – Timor 
Leste National Police) having grown up under Indonesian occupation, do not speak 
Portuguese. This has the potential to make the enforcement of the rule of law rather 
subjective.  
 
UNMIT has recently been extended until February of 2011 and is primarily a police-
building and state-building mission, although there are 33 military liaison officers 
attached to it. The United Nations Civilian Police (UNPOL) component of UNMIT at 
the end of February 2010, had over 1500 officers drawn from 38 participating UN 
members (UNMIT, 2010). The current UNMIT Police Commissioner Luis Miguel 
Carrilho has been with the United Nations since 1996, working on civilian police 
(civpol) training with the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), and was also involved in the earlier (1999-2002) United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). He is also the commander of 
one of the largest components of the UNPOL mission training the PNTL, the 
Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), which is essentially a paramilitary 
force. This raises the rather vexed question of the skill sets required to teach policing 
to nascent state forces such as the PNTL, a point developed by Goldsmith (2006: 32), 
and Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007). In many such places, there is often a contrary 
history of developing special police units as quasi-praetorian guards for political 
figures, as well as ongoing underlying political instability, pressuring external donors 
as well as inclining local political authorities to boost the public order and the 
paramilitary capacities of local police forces undergoing reform (see Goldsmith 
2009). These tendencies or patterns do not make the task of training police 
                                                
1 The F-FDTL is the acronym for the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste where ‘Falantil’ is 
itself an acronym for the Forças Armadas de Libertação de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the 
Liberation of East Timor). 
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particularly easy, and if laws are applied partially the POC as a concept is less solid 
than it needs to be, as some will be more protected than others. 
 
In dollar terms the largest donors on average to Timor Leste are Australia and 
Portugal, who gave USD$79 million and $43 million respectively in 2007-08, the 
latest year for which data is available (OECD 2010a). With 83% of the total $278 
million in development aid being bilateral, these two states represent (28%) and 
(15%), or about 43% of total aid pledged. As such it is no surprise that both are 
heavily involved in building the security sector, especially after the 2006 troubles. 
Australia’s aid to Timor Leste comes mostly through the $53.7 million to pay for the 
Australian Federal Police who are present in the country as the International 
Deployment Group training the PNTL. So far some 800 PNTL trained by the AFP in 
collaboration with the United Nations. Portugal deploys around 140 GNR as part of 
UNMIT (Expresso 2010), down from about 200 in 2009. The GNR itself is essentially 
a paramilitary unit, subject to military law and organization, which differs from the 
AFP’s ‘community policing’ model, which consists of community partnerships, 
organisational transformation and problem solving.  
 
Another state, the USA, also commits funds to police training, as part of the $9.45 
million it provides to Timor Leste. While the majority goes to development 
assistance, and just over one million goes to International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement, some $300,000 is directed towards International Military Education and 
Training, which involves creating a non-partisan and professional force that will 
support and advise the police (USAID 2009). Along side this is the non-UN 
International Stabilisation Force (ISF), which is the Australian led Operation 
ASTUTE, comprising an ‘ANZAC Battle Group made up of Australian and New 
Zealand personnel, together with other support forces’ (Nautilus 2010a).2 Also 
in support of the military side, Australia has been training Timorese at the Royal 
Military College of Duntroon and two had graduated by mid 2008, while under the 
larger Defence Cooperation Program, again sitting outside of the UNMIT, ADF 
forces and NZ armed forces under Operation Tower, have been training F-FDTL 
troops and funded the construction of the $6 million training centre at Metinaro in 
March 2009 (Nautilus, 2010b).  
 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Timor Leste is one of the main objectives of 
UNMIT. In February and March of 2010 three pieces of legislation were passed that 
essentially create a new National Security Policy in Timor Leste to create integrated 
action between the Armed Forces, Police and Civil Protection (East Timor Law and 
Justice Bulletin 2010). Such a step appears necessary as after the shooting of Ramos 
Horta in 2008, a joint command between Army and Police was set up but it appears to 
                                                
2 The ADF website does not provide precise numbers but claims: “The ISF is in the process of 
adjusting its force size to meet improving peace and stability conditions in East Timor. At the 
completion of this process the ISF will consist of one Australian Infantry Company drawn from the 
Second Batallion, The Royal Australian Regiment, a New Zealand Infantry Company drawn from the 
2/1 Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, and support elements such as engineers, logistics and 
supply personnel. The ISF also includes the Timor Leste Aviation Group (TLAG) drawn primarily 
from the Australian 5th Aviation Regiment with Australian Black Hawk S70A-9 helicopters. The ISF 
operates at the invitation of the Government of East Timor, and in support of the United Nations, to 
maintain stability and provide a secure environment for the ongoing development of East Timor.” 
(ADF: 2010). The force may thus be anywhere between about 500-800 personnel.  
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not be functioning effectively (ICG, 2009) and policing the streets has developed into 
an issue of Timorese against international police, especially UN Police. Other 
possible obstacles to SSR include the ways in which members of the Timorese elite 
appear to be enjoying a privileged position, which weakens the perception that the law 
is being applied evenly. Presidential interventions in the justice system also make it 
difficult to create a feeling among the population that the law is indeed fair, and fairly 
upheld. Without this fundamental principal that no one is above the law, donor states 
have their work cut out for them to build a new police culture. They must include 
local actors in making a system that works for Timor Leste, but they must also work 
to create a system that is transparent and fair, so as to build respect for the law and 
human rights. At the moment at least two different, and competing, policing models 
appear to be the subject of police training in the PNTL – the paramilitary style of the 
GNR and the community policing style of the AFP. Both have their advantages, but 
they cannot exist within the same organization.   
 
State building has an exit strategy and in Timor Leste the UN is gradually handing 
back responsibilities to the PNTL. In December 2009 the Police Intelligence Unit 
came under Timorese leadership, the seventeenth such unit to do so. Since May 2009 
five districts, Lautem, Oecusse, Manatuto and Vinqueque, and the city of Bacau, have 
now come under PNTL command, while UN police assist and support their work. 
(UN News Centre, 2010a; 2010b). With over ten year of police training since 
UNTAET, even the Secretary General’s Special Representative, Ameerah Haq, is 
urging caution, noting that while there has been remarkable progress, there are many 
obstacles ahead. She identified longer-term socio-economic challenges such as 
poverty, hunger, and health care as crucial to recovery and development. Within this 
context policing can lead the way in terms of a cultural transformation in social 
attitudes to what is acceptable behaviour for Timorese citizens (UN News Centre 
2010c). 
 
While it is important for the PNTL to develop the capability to run itself, the extent of 
the transmission of a culture of respect for and education about RtoP is debatable, 
principally as the organizations doing the teaching in this vital state institution are 
perhaps themselves unaware of RtoP principles, or do not have RtoP as a specific part 
of their own training. This is not to say that international police do not know how to 
protect civilians; they clearly do, as this is the fundamental role of all police. Basic 
police training is to develop a person to assist those in need, to protect people from 
harm and to investigate complaints. It is not exactly the language of “RtoP” but it may 
work just as well. Adopting consistent training may be enhanced by the drafting of an 
international code of policing, a matter suggested by the Police Commissioner 
(Retired), and former Australian Police Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, United Nations, former UN Undersecretary of Policing, Andrew Hughes, 
at the International Challenges Forum (ICF 2010, Session 9) in the report back from 
the working group on policing. Further testing of this hypothesis will occur during 
fieldwork in 2010 and 2011. 
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Solomon Islands 
 
Australian Overseas Development Assistance in Oceania supports ‘police-building’ 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen, 2007) and aims to develop capacity so that states in the 
region begin to adopt the culture of civilian protection through a strengthening of 
institutions. This is seen in Timor Leste and in Solomon Islands, to which in April 
2003 the Howard government agreed to lead a force with the intention of stabilising 
the state and reducing levels of community violence. This overturned a long-term 
“hands off” policy when it came to the affairs of the Pacific Islands and as in Timor 
Leste, the operation in Solomon Islands involves both military and police in state 
building. RAMSI landed in July 2003 and is not a UN mission, although it does 
provide updates to the Security Council roughly every six months. 
 
Australia is the largest single donor to the Solomon Islands state, providing almost 
$200 million (86%) of its aid funding on average in 2007-8. Aid also contributed over 
35% of Solomon Islands GNI in 2008 (OECD 2010b). The only other significant 
donors are New Zealand ($20 million), and Japan ($12 million), although the Asian 
Development Fund ($6 million) and the European Commission ($5 million) also play 
a role. 
 
RAMSI is ostensibly a multinational effort that is dominated and mostly funded by 
Australia. While initially characterised by a heavy military presence of over 1800, this 
quickly gave way to civilian policing and technocratic assistance in managing 
governance and balancing budgets. By August 2005, there were just 80 armed troops, 
half of them Australian, and matters appeared to have been going well. But state 
building is never simple and tensions sometimes flare, as they did following political 
instability in April 2006 when violence erupted and the commercial sector of Honiara 
was razed (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007: 1102). The Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
was required to send in emergency troops to restore calm and to support the policing 
component, known as the Participating Police Force (PPF), who normally work 
alongside and mentor members of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF), 
previously known, until 2005, as the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) (Nautilus 
2010 c).  
 
RAMSI’s PPF is comprised of some 250-300 officers (precise numbers vary), mostly 
from Australia, New Zealand. Papua New Guinea police, as well as some from 
Vanuatu and 12 other Pacific islands states, also assist in the PPF, whose current 
commander is Wayne Buchhorn of the AFP. PPF have worked alongside the 
restructured and largely restaffed SIPF since 2003, when RAMSI acted on the 
endemic corruption within RSIP has and dismissed over 200 people from the 800 
strong police force, later arresting 160 on various charges including ‘corruption, 
murder, assault, rape, intimidation and robbery’. From 2004 at the Police 
Academy at Rove on Guadalcanal, PPF have trained four batches of recruits who are 
now operating in various parts of country (RAMSI 2010). 
 
The PPF assist in training and building trust in communities as part of a strategy of 
community policing. Australian Federal Police comprise the largest portion of the 
PPF and contribute to the development of the community policing strategy. This 
process is assisted by New Zealand, which has allocated $36 million to Solomon 
Islands for 2009/2010, its largest bilateral programme. In terms of law and order New 
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Zealand works with AusAID to staff the legal system with qualified magistrates, as 
well as contributing police to the PPF who are themselves trained in community 
policing (NZAID 2010).  
 
The PPF plays a variety of roles in Solomon Islands, among them training of RSIP 
officers, but there has been criticism of the model of policing adopted (Dinnen, 
McLeod, Peake, 2006:97) as it essentially imported Australian tactics and operations 
to Solomon Islands with little regard to existing practices. Poor cultural awareness 
and linguistic skills also made cooperation between RSIP and AFP in the PPF 
difficult, although moves recently have led to better preparation by AFP and more 
intensive in-country training. Lessons learned from the April 2006 riots have led to 
moves to increase deployment lengths for up to two years, and to provide 
accommodation for families to attract ‘more stable long-term officers to the force’ 
(O’Callaghan 2008: 191) so a greater sense of community policing has the chance of 
being established. The documentary Policing the Pacific (SBS 2006), showed that 
people’s need for justice is strong, yet tensions remain between the justice of the state 
and the justice of kastom (custom). This strikes at the heart of the relationship 
betweens state and citizen, and highlights the seeming irrelevance of the state for 
many of its citizens. In part imagining a bond between citizen and state goes back to 
modern Western assumptions surrounding what states should do, and to the inability 
of many post-colonial states to meet the demands for services placed upon them. It 
points also towards an incomplete acceptance of the notion of state power as 
legitimate as people struggle to accept the legal and political culture imposed by 
‘exogenous state building’ (Dodge 2006).  
 
RAMSI must negotiate many complex issues, but the situation in Solomon Islands 
today is much improved on the violence that occurred between 1998-2003 when up to 
20,000 people were displaced and dozens murdered (Hawksley 2007: 126). Levels of 
violence have diminished, and in the activities of RAMSI there is some intersection of 
POC and RtoP principles.  RAMSI has funded a training course on corrections, 
delivered by the Queensland’s Sunshine Coast TAFE, in which 25% of students were 
women and which has led to some capacity to assess and train other staff – essentially 
a train the trainer program (Solomon Times 2009). Many of these will operate the 
new correctional facility at Auki on Malaita. Gender mainstreaming, the practice of 
developing gender perspectives and equality within all levels and institutions of 
government, has been recognised as vital to building peace after conflict since at least 
1997 (OSAGI 2010).  
 
The most intensive training of SIPF comes through the Solomon Islands Police Force 
Leadership Development Program run by the Australian Institute of Police 
Management (AIPM 2010). The Force Leadership Program commenced in 2004 has 
five levels: 
1. Leadership lessons delivered by SIPF instructors to recruits. 
2. Introductory Police Leadership Program, to introduce officers to concepts of 
leadership. 
3. Middle management Leadership Program for experienced officers to develop 
effectiveness. 
4. Advanced Leadership Program for experienced officers. 
5. Training of the executive of SIPF, including workshops and seminars.  
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Clearly there is an effort in Solomon Islands to build the police into a professional 
force, although exactly what the training consists of is unknown at this stage. The in-
line patrols take SIPF officers through the basics of policing such as report writing, 
evidence taking, crowd management and crime scene investigation (Policing the 
Pacific, 2006). All of these things build towards POC and thus help develop the 
capacity of the state to administer its own laws and justice. Tensions remain between 
methods of modern policing and traditional concepts of justice through kastom, but it 
is obvious that the steps being taken are helping to develop a capacity to uphold law 
and order, at least in and around the capital of Honiara, and fieldwork will ascertain 
how far this influence spreads.  
 
Conclusions 
The adoption of Responsibility to Protect principles by the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly through the World Summit followed a decade of soul searching 
after failure to protect adequately civilians from atrocities. After the April-June 1994 
Rwanda Massacres the UN vowed Never Again would it fail to protect a civilian 
population from harm. The repositioning and reconceptualisation of the demands of 
sovereignty, so that states are primarily responsible for the treatment of all who dwell 
within their boundaries, has not yet solved this dilemma. State building, which 
involves security with development, aims to create the capacity for this to occur. In 
Timor Leste and Solomon Islands the idea of a national government is still a work in 
progress and these situations are complex. The UNSG’s report (UNGA 2009: 13) 
notes that states that have already suffered war crimes and human rights violations, 
such as Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, have to work through a process of social 
reconciliation. This process must occur alongside the building of institutions so that 
social healing, and the strengthening of respect for law, order and the state are 
combined to create good and just societies.  
 
A fuller examination of the interaction between police from Australia, Portugal and 
New Zealand, in particular, in training their counterparts in PNTL and SIPF, is 
especially important to discover whether positive and tangible improvements in 
human rights are filtering through to the communities being policed. On the bright 
side the function of police is to uphold the law and protect people from harm, so it is 
very likely that building strong police forces in Timor Leste and Solomon Islands will 
assist in creating capacity for these states to respect the rights of their populations. 
Whether this is in line with basic a POC function, or whether it develops its language 
to consciously adopt the rhetoric of RtoP remains to be seen. 
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